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PRESERVING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE-
AN EXEGESIS
Alfred P. Carlton, Jr.*
When the English landed in Jamestown in 1607, they brought to
our shores their language, their government, their commercial sys-
tem, and their courts.1 We kept the first three but threw the fourth
one back. The court system, at least in the colonies, was badly
flawed.
Over the seventeen days in which Thomas Jefferson wove the
Declaration of Independence, he carefully selected the threads of
twenty-seven specific grievances against the King to make his case
for American independence.2 In that document, Jefferson declared
that the King had "made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for
the tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their
Salaries." 3
When the signers of the Declaration united behind the pen of
Jefferson, they literally pledged "our Lives, our Fortunes and our
sacred Honor" to the principle of judicial independence. James
Madison, the principal author of the Constitution, considered judi-
cial independence an indispensable component of a democracy.' If
a declaration of rights was "incorporated into the constitution," he
observed, "independent tribunals of justice will consider them-
selves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will
be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in
* Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., is the president-elect of the American Bar Association,
past chair of the ABA House of Delegates, and the former chair of the ABA Standing
Committee on Judicial Independence. He is a partner in the full service international
law firm of Kilpatrick Stockton LLP. Carlton received his BS and JD from the Uni-
versity of North Carolina; and an MPA from the University of Dayton. This article
was drawn from the author's keynote address to the North Carolina Center for Voter
Education in Raleigh, North Carolina, on December 7, 2001. The author thanks Tim
Kolly for his assistance in preparing the remarks, as well as Luke Bierman, with whom
the author has collaborated for the past four years in directing the ABA's judicial
independence efforts. This "exegesis" is largely a product of that collaboration.
1. CARL BRIDENBAUGH, JAMESTOWN 1544-1699 153 (1980); EARL SCHENCK
MIERS, BLOOD OF FREEDOM 40-47 (1958).
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 3-30 (U.S. 1776).
3. Id. at para. 11.
4. Id. at para. 33.
5. THE FEDERALIST, No. 51 (James Madison), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTION
OUR WRITTEN LEGACY 60-2 (Joseph A. Melusky ed., 1990).
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the legislature or executive 6.... I These words came from one
who had experienced the abuses of a judiciary whose authority de-
rived more from kings than principles.
Our early state constitutions also acknowledged the importance
of judicial independence by providing for appointed judges serving
within an independent branch of government. 7 Indeed, the Massa-
chusetts Constitution's provisions for life tenure, insisted upon by
John Adams,8 may well have been the model for Article III of the
Federal Constitution.9
Despite the early sentiment in favor of an independent judiciary,
it was not fully realized in the early years of the Republic. In 1802,
Congress, controlled for the first time by Jeffersonian Republicans,
repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801.1° This repeal essentially
handed pink slips to the federal judges created by the Act and ap-
pointed by lame duck Federalist John Adams. a' Resolution of the
legitimacy of judges appointed under the Act was delayed when
the 1802 Supreme Court term was cancelled by the Republican
Congress.12 Marbury v. Madison was put off until 1803,1' when the
authority of the Supreme Court of the United States to declare
federal acts unconstitutional was established, citing the North Car-
olina case of Bayard v. Singleton as precedent.14
6. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (1789); James Madison, Speech to the House of Rep-
resentatives (June 8, 1789) [hereinafter Speech of James Madison], reprinted in 12
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 198, 207 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977).
7. See U.S. INFO. AGENCY, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, AN OUTLINE OF AMERICAN
HISTORY (Howard Cincotta et al eds., 1994) ("[A]ll the constitutions paid allegiance
to the three-branch structure of government-executive, legislative and judiciary-
each checked and balanced by the others."). For a full review of the complete text of
early state constitutions, see YALE LAW SCHOOL, THE AVALON PROJECT: COLONIAL
CHARTERS, GRANTS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/ava-
lon/states/statech.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2002).
8. Margaret H. Marshall, Foreword, 44 BOSTON B.J. 4 (2000).
9. U.S. CONST. art. III.
10. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS,
1801-1829, 275 n.314 (1997); RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS
AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 57-58 (1971); CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789-
1835, 227-30 (1944); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY, 1789-1835, 206-07, 217-18 (2d ed. 1926).
11. ELLIS, supra note 10, at 61-62; HAINES, supra note 10, at 259-62; WARREN,
supra note 10, at 206.
12. ELLIS, supra note 10, at 59.
13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
14. Bayard v. Singleton, 3 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787).
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Still not having exorcised its pique with the judiciary, the Repub-
licans impeached Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase in 1804.15
Since "high Crimes and Misdemeanors 1 6 were then, as now, in the
eyes and anger of the beholder,17 Chase was called to account for
voiding part of a congressional act while "riding circuit" as a trial
judge.18 Chase must have stood uneasy in the Senate for two rea-
sons: first, the charges themselves and, second, the presiding officer
was Vice President Aaron Burr who had only recently shot and
killed the Federalists' intellectual leader Alexander Hamilton in
their notorious duel. 9 Chase was nevertheless acquitted and
served as an effective and distinguished member of the Court until
his death.20
These early excursions into the minefields of our uniquely
American brand of judicial independence remind us of the need
for constant vigilance. Judicial independence endures because it is
not a distant ideal; it does not go in and out of fashion with public
opinion; it is not forfeited through the occasional indiscretions of
judges or judicial candidates seeking a seat on the bench. It is as
indispensable for a justice of the peace as a Justice of the Supreme
Court.
Judicial independence is precious to our way of life. Judicial in-
dependence is a fundamental principle upon which our country was
founded and for which Americans have died, not only at York-
town21 and Valley Forge,22 but at the Alamo,23 Iwo Jima,24 In-
chon,25 Khe Sanh,26 and, now, Mazar-E-Sharif. 27
15. Several of the articles of impeachment against Chase are reproduced in STE-
PHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 229-31 (3d ed. 1995).
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
17. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Defining "High Crimes And Misdemeanors":
Basic Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712 (1999).
18. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 15, at 229-31 (stating the reasons for bring-
ing impeachment proceedings against Chase).
19. FORREST McDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY 359-61 (1979)
(describing the practice of dueling and the circumstances surrounding Hamilton's
death).
20. ELLIS, supra note 10, at 101-02 (reporting the vote breakdown in the Senate
for Chase's impeachment proceedings).
21. McDONALD, supra note 19, at 25.
22. John Marshall stated, "At no period of the war ... had the American army
been reduced to a situation of greater peril than during the winter at Valley Forge."
LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 45 (1974).
23. LON TINKLE, 13 DAYS TO GLORY: THE SEIGE OF THE ALAMO 220-21 (1958).
24. KARAL ANN MARLING & JOHN WETENHALL, IWO JIMA 221 (1991).
25. STEVEN HUGH LEE, THE KOREAN WAR 47 (2001).
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Our responsibility to the founders who instituted judicial inde-
pendence and the patriots who protected it. is constant vigilance
against those who would undermine it. Our democracy will not
function without independent courts. Trying to maintain our ex-
periment in self government without a truly independent judiciary
is like trying to push a rope. It just won't work.
It will work, however, and work best, when the courts enjoy the
public's approbation and support. After all, the courts are depen-
dent on the public's perception that the courts are impartial and
independent of manipulation or control by the two political
branches of government and narrow special interests. If the courts
are co-opted through pressure, coercion, or intimidation, we lose
the necessary checks that the courts provide in our democratic re-
public. To my way of thinking, then, judicial independence is the
most critical barometer of the health of a democratic republic.
In some ways, the judicial branch is the one most accessible and
responsive to the people. Structurally and practically, the execu-
tive and legislative branches are more suited to respond to majori-
ties or large minorities.28 Only the courts are equipped to respond
immediately to petitions and redress the grievances of individuals.
If powerful interest groups and campaign contributions corrupt the
courts, where is the check on the wealthy and the powerful against
the general welfare and those without the power of what Madison
characterized as factions?
The courts are the last lines of defense of the Constitution and
individual rights. They are the country's protection against an
over-reaching government, official corruption, and the mood sw-
ings of popular opinion. They are the ballast of democracy that
keeps the ship upright through bad weather, shifting loads, and
poor seamanship-the bulwark of the republic. 29
How important is it that our courts be perceived as impartial and
fair? The public expects the executive and legislative branches to
26. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE VIETNAM WAR: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND MILI-
TARY HISTORY 206 (Spencer C. Tucker ed., 1998).
27. Carla Anne Robbins & Greg Jaffe, Counterattack: U.S. Launches Strikes On
Taliban, bin Laden With Aid of British, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2001, at Al.
28. THEODORE J. STEIN, SOCIAL POLICY AND POLICYMAKING BY THE BRANCHES
OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC-AT-LARGE 96-97 (2001) (explaining the way a
voting majority can influence the policymaking process).
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). At a conference titled Bulwarks of the Republic: Judicial Independence and
Accountability in the American System of Justice, held December 4-5, 1998, in Phila-
delphia, this vision of judicial independence was discussed. See Conference, Judicial
Independence and Accountability, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1998).
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be biased toward an agenda and the groups that support it. But if
the public ever perceives that the court bases its decisions on fac-
tors other than the evidence, the laws, and the Constitution, it will
lose its respect for the law. And when the public loses its respect
for the law, we lose the centripetal force that binds us to our
nationhood.
Thus far we have spoken about the necessity for judicial inde-
pendence, but what exactly is it and what are the problems associ-
ated with maintaining it?
Judicial independence only exists when judges base their deci-
sions on a good faith interpretation of the laws, the Constitution,
and the facts of an individual case. Any external pressure or influ-
ence that causes a judge to deviate from such an interpretation di-
minishes judicial independence.
In 1997, the ABA's Commission on Separation of Powers and
Judicial Independence issued its report, An Independent Judici-
ary.30 The Commission acknowledged several thorny problems in
the federal judiciary system.31 But by and large, the Commission
concluded that "Without denying its faults, our federal judges ad-
minister impartial justice of unparalleled quality. ' 32 Not so in the
states. The Commission concluded that the greatest threats to judi-
cial independence lie in the state courts.33 There are a number of
reasons why.
Sheer numbers is one reason. State courts handle more than
ninety-seven percent of all litigation in the United States.34 There
are more cases, more courts, more judges, and more opportunity
for mischief. Second, unlike federal judges, most state judges have
no lifetime tenure. Judges must stand for either election or reten-
tion in thirty-eight states.35 Indeed, some eighty percent of all state
court judges stand for election at some point in their careers.36
Judges must campaign for their office and raise increasingly large
30. ABA, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (1997).
31. See id. (including the increase in judicial criticism and legislative control over
the judiciary's financial resources).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, ABA, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANC-
ING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS (2001) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
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amounts of money-usually from lawyers and narrow interest
groups-to gain or retain their seats.37
Voters may not like a federal court ruling, but, because of life
tenure, they can be certain that it was not made to secure contribu-
tions or votes. State judges, fairly or not, do not enjoy the same
benefit of the doubt and, indeed, forfeit it through questionable
campaign behavior or the acceptance of campaign contributions
that present the appearance of impropriety. As judges are increas-
ingly thrust into public policy debates, either through election
campaigning or from the bench, this perceived impropriety has
reared its ugly head across the country. Public opinion surveys in
Ohio,38 Pennsylvania 39 and Texas40 tell us that citizens are con-
cerned about the impact of campaign fundraising on the impartial-
ity of justice. A survey of judges in Texas incredibly reveals that
almost half of the judges polled indicated some impact on decision
making from campaign contributions.4'
These developments result from the nature of the judicial pro-
cess. The young French noble Alexis de Toqueville observed some
175 years ago that every political debate in America would find its
way to the courts as a legal dispute.42 We know today that this is
true as we ask our judges to resolve not just disputes between busi-
nesses or neighbors, but the most difficult issues facing our soci-
ety-from who should be president of the United States to how our
liberties should be defined during a time of national emergency.
We know that unpopular judicial decisions are inevitable, as illus-
37. See id. at 11 (reporting the ABA commission's finding that "to cover their
election costs, judges must accept funds from contributors many of whom may be
interested in the outcomes of cases before them").
38. See id. at 22 (citing T.C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor Campaign
Donors, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 15, 2000, at 1A) (reporting that "nine out
of ten residents believed that campaign contributions influences judicial decisions").
39. SUPREME COURT OF PA., REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT (1998); Sheila Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying
of the Bench, NATION, Jan. 26, 1998, at 11 (discussing the growing problem of judicial
contributions). See also Rich Henson & Robert Zausner, Survey Finds Cynicism
About Pa. Judiciary Rampant Among Public, PHIL. INQUIRER, Apr. 17, 1998, at B01
(reporting that "nine out of ten voters believed that judicial decisions were influences
by large campaign contributors").
40. SUPREME CT. OF TEXAS, STATE BAR OF TEX. & TEXAS OFFICE OF CT ADMIN.,
THE COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN TEXAS-THE INSIDER'S PERSPECTIVE
(1999) (reporting that the vast majority of Texas adults believe campaign contributors
influenced judicial decisions).
41. Id.
42. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE ON DEMOCRACY, REVOLUTION, AND SOCIETY: SE-
LECTED WRITINGS (John Stone & Stephen Mennell eds., 1980); TOCQUEVILLE'S
AMERICA : THE GREAT QUOTATIONS (Frederick Kershner ed., 1983).
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trated by Justice Frankfurter's observation, "It is a fair summary of
history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been
forged in controversies involving not very nice people."43 Judges
inevitably must bear the brunt of this, and judicial independence is
the cloak that allows them to do it.
In this increasingly contentious atmosphere, our courts have
gradually become the new battleground for conflicts over policy.
More and more special interest groups are involved in state judicial
races. Presumably, it is easier to help elect a few strategically
placed judges than scores of legislators, especially if the fate of the
legislation will be decided by the courts, as it often is.
State courts face other challenges as well, among them inappro-
priate criticism. Criticizing judges is one of the ways in which we
hold the judiciary accountable in our democracy. But that criticism
should be limited to questions of integrity, competence, or knowl-
edge of the law, not whether a decision is compatible with a politi-
cal philosophy, ideology, or special interest. If we disagree with a
decision, we can appeal and if we remain dissatisfied when the ap-
peal is concluded, it may well be that we need to change the law-
but not the judge.
Intemperate, inaccurate, and emotional criticism that is designed
to intimidate with the threat of impeachment or election defeat un-
dermines public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary and
hence its independence. Often such criticism is generated by disa-
greement with a single decision that goes against the interests of
one group or another. The resulting criticism often delivers the
message, justice is for sale to the highest bidder. Is such criticism
protected speech? Of course it is. Is it irresponsible? Of course it
is.
This state of affairs has led many interested citizens and organi-
zations to rally to the defense of the American judiciary. We do
not do so because we agree with every decision issued by every
court-as a lawyer with a healthy practice, I can name a few deci-
sions I wish went the other way. We do so because of our commit-
ment to the rule of the law based on an independent judiciary with
the ability to make hard decisions to protect the rights and liberties
of all.
As president-elect of the American Bar Association, I am proud
to be in the leadership of an organization that has taken the preser-
vation and enhancement of judicial independence seriously. As
43. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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many of you know, the American Bar Association has a long his-
tory of support for judicial independence. In fact, our support is as
long as our history. When the ABA was established in 1878, we
began with three fundamental purposes that remain the foundation
for everything that we do:
1. To establish and maintain the world's best system of legal
education;
2. To act as a responsible representative of the legal profession;
and
3. To protect, maintain and insure the independence and qual-
ity of the American judiciary.
Who other than those who love the law to such an extent that
they make it their lives' work are better equipped and more obli-
gated to defend the barricades of judicial independence?
That task is not always easy because there has always been an
inner tension between two principal characteristics of the Ameri-
can judiciary: independence and accountability. The reflex of the
American citizen is to hold government officials directly accounta-
ble to the American electorate. Given the choice, Americans seem
inclined to elect everyone from the president to the dogcatcher.
The obvious need here is for organized, substantial, and sus-
tained public education, not just for the general public, but for
policymakers and other civic leaders. Many of the threats to judi-
cial independence arise from interference or intimidation by the
executive and legislative branches of government, and neglect by
others in positions of authority and influence.
Although the ABA has defended judicial independence for 123
years, until four years ago we had no permanent program to pro-
mote it. We now have a Standing Committee on Judicial Indepen-
dence that has developed an ambitious program to support the
judicial institution around the country.4
We are responding to the need for public trust and confidence in
the judiciary. A 1999 public opinion survey for the ABA showed
only twenty-six percent of respondents could be termed "highly
knowledgeable" about the American justice system.45 When asked
how they would prefer to learn about the justice system, seventy-
44. The ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence's home page is http:/
/www.abanet.org/judind/home.html.
45. Div. FOR MEDIA RELATIONS AND PUB. AFFAIRS, ABA, PERCEPTIONS OF THE
U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM, 10 (1999), available at www.abanet.org/media/perception/per-
ceptions.pdf.
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five percent wanted to learn directly from judges.46 What clearer
mandate could we have been given?
So we at the ABA, alone and with others, have established pro-
grams encouraging judges to get out in the community and reach
out to national and local civic and community organizations.47 But
our work has not stopped there. Over the past four years, we have
developed a number of reports and policies designed to improve
state judicial processes and combat perceived improprieties.
In 1998, the ABA established a plan to respond to inappropriate
criticism of judges.48 It generally is considered inappropriate for a
judge to respond to such criticism because it reduces the dignity of
the administration of justice, risks an intemperate or emotional re-
sponse to criticism, and may have an undesirable effect on pending
litigation or litigants. It is explicitly within the bar's role to step
into the void and set the record straight when appropriate.4 9 The
ABA plan sets guidelines indicating when intervention is appropri-
ate and how it should be done.50 No one has a greater stake in the
integrity and dignity of the courts, so it is reasonable that attorneys
should defend them from inappropriate criticism.
In 1999, the ABA House of Delegates amended the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct to limit judicial campaign contributions and
provide for recusal of judges when excessive campaign contribu-
tions occur.51 In 2000, the ABA House of Delegates established
standards for state judicial selection that encourage a form of
"merit election" to diminish the worst effects of partisanship.52 In
46. Id. at 11.
47. DAVID MATHEWS, POLITICS FOR PEOPLE: FINDING A RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC
VOICE (1994) (summarizing the approach of the National Issues Forum in facilitating
small group discussion of issues); Jack L. Brown, The Judges Network, JUDGES' J.,
Spring 2001, at 33 (describing the conception and goals of the Judges Network); Amy
Goldstein & Charles Lane, At D.C. School, Justice Kennedy and Teens Explore U.S.
Values, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2002, at A7 (explaining that the ABA sponsored "Dia-
logue on Freedom" was "intended to foster thinking about such fundamental ques-
tions as what it means to be an American, to live in a pluralistic "melting pot," and to
value freedom and civil liberties).
48. ABA JUDICIAL Div. LAWYERS CONFERENCE AND SPECIAL COMM'N ON JUDI-
CIAL INDEPENDENCE, ABA, RESPONSE TO CRITICISM OF JUDGES (1998).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Press Release, ABA, American Bar Association Changes Model Judicial Eth-
ics Rules To Reform Election Campaign Funding (Aug. 24, 1999).
52. Press Release, ABA, American Bar Association House of Delegates Ap-
proves Standards for State Judicial Selection (Aug. 16, 2000). See generally Larry
Aspin, Campaigns in Judicial Retention Elections: Do They Make a Difference?, JUST.
Sys. J. 1998, at 1-15; Leon S. Cohan, Surprise! A Merit Selection Process that Works,
MICH. B.J., Sept. 1996, at 914; Kevin M. Easterling, Judicial Elections the Right Way:
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February of 2002, the House of Delegates will consider adopting
the report of the ABA Commission on Public Financing of State
Judicial Campaigns, which recommends the use of public financing
for state judicial campaigns.53
These projects and programs are part of the ABA's multi dimen-
sional approach to support judicial independence in the states.
They have been building blocks of a sort that lead to my service as
president of the American Bar Association. As president, I intend
to undertake a comprehensive review of twenty-first century state
judiciaries by convening a high profile commission of leaders in
American law and policy. This group will be led by Abner Mikva,
former US representative from Illinois, chief judge of the DC Cir-
cuit and counsel to the President, and William S. Sessions, former
FBI director and US district judge.54 My expectation is that this
group will establish a set of neutral principles to provide a standard
for impartial and accountable judges and fair administration of
state judicial systems. It is an ambitious project, but one that is
necessary if we are to diminish the increasing partisan battles being
fought over our state courts.
Finally, we arrive at the core of the problem. By far the most
troubling threats to judicial independence are those associated with
judicial elections. These fall into two categories: campaign prac-
tices and campaign finance.
First, campaign practices. Sometimes a judicial candidate just
cannot help acting like a political candidate despite judicial canons
expressly forbidding it. Or perhaps we are finding that the regula-
tory restrictions on judicial candidates are being eliminated, as has
Official Performance Evaluations Help the Electorate as Well as the Bench, JUDICA-
TURE, March/April 1999, at 206-215; Charles W. Fleming, Election, Appointment,
Merit Selection of Judges, CT. REV., Fall 1993, at 10-12; John Gibeaut, Bench Battle:
Trial Judges Often Keep Their Seats Without Facing Election, ABA J., Aug. 2000, at
42-50, 111.
53. On February 5, 2002 the ABA recommendation for public financing was
adopted. Press Release, ABA, American Bar Association Adopts Recommendation
Calling for Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns; Cites Need to Minimize the Role
of Money in Electing Judges (Feb. 5, 2002).
54. Abner Mikva served as Counsel to President Bill Clinton from October 1,
1994 until November 1, 1995. He was a United States representative from Illinois'
Second District from 1969-73 and Tenth District from 1975-79, and began service as
chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on January 12, 1991.
William S. Sessions was a United States district judge from 1974-87 and FBI director
from 1987-93.
844
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
occurred in North Carolina.55 It is noteworthy that just this week,
the Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to review a
case from the Eighth Circuit that involved a challenge to restric-
tions imposed on judicial candidates in Minnesota. 56 I hope that
the Supreme Court recognizes once and for all the unique factors
that distinguish the judiciary from the legislature and executive
branch, which provide a sufficiently compelling state interest to
justify regulations in the judicial campaign context. In any event,
this case provides a rare opportunity for the Supreme Court to of-
fer some guidance in this area.
In order to garner votes or curry favor with influential interest
groups, judicial candidates are sometimes pressured to declare in
advance how they would decide a particular case. This is like ask-
ing an umpire to call a pitch before it is thrown. Each case is differ-
ent and must be decided on its merits, not on some pre-announced
politically opportunistic position. As John Marshall warned, "I
have always thought, from my earliest youth till now that the great-
est scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and
sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent
judiciary."57
Far more troubling are ads and statements that are misleading or
unfair. Often this tactic is employed through the use of "issue ad-
vocacy," which enjoys First Amendment protection under the Su-
preme Court's 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valeo.58 The effect of such
ads is a clear erosion of the dignity of the courts. Because of the
special trust and role of the judiciary, judicial candidates must take
responsibility for all campaigning done on their behalf and con-
demn any that is unfair or misleading. We must take great care to
ensure that "express ads" do not masquerade as "issue ads." Those
who have sponsored them must be called publicly into account for
them. These ads undermine public trust and confidence in the
55. For a discussion of the backlash to judicial campaign deregulation see William
Glaberson, States Taking Steps to Rein in Excesses of Judicial Politicking, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 2001, at Al.
56. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. granted,
122 S. Ct. 643 (2001) (upholding constitutionality of "announce clause" in code of
judicial conduct restricting judicial candidates from announcing how they would re-
solve and issue likely to come before them); Tony Mauro, Judge Election on Court
Debate, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 10, 2001, at 10.
57. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-
30, at 615-19 (1830); John J. Parker, The Judicial Office in the United States, 20 TENN.
L. REV. 703, 706 (1949) (citing John Marshall's statement made during Virginia Con-
stitutional Convention debate).
58. Buckley v. Valeo, 425 U.S. 946 (1976).
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courts. Responsible citizenship consistent with the exercise of the
right to free expression should be the rule, not the exception.
We know that the judiciary is different from the legislature and
the executive. We elect executive and legislative candidates based
upon their positions on issues. We expect them to be partial to an
agenda and to favor those constituencies that support that agenda.
But judges cannot be political candidates in the same way. Wear-
ing a robe, a judge is neither Republican nor Democrat, but consti-
tutionally obligated to resolve cases based only on the law and the
facts. A judge has no constituency but due process and the rule of
law and must be above the shifting sands of political expediency.
The courts are the great equalizer of society. Within their walls,
the rich and the poor, the educated and the uneducated, the strong
and the weak stand without distinction in the leveling light of the
Constitution and our body of laws. Each comes with the expecta-
tion of justice. But if the public believes that a litigant will get
"more justice" because of a contribution to a judge's election cam-
paign, that judge is not capable of words or actions sufficient to
dispel the belief that justice is compromised.
Thus, the "invisible elephant in the parlor" is money and judicial
campaigns. There is nothing so corrosive to the public confidence
in the judicial system than the growing amounts of money that are
being pumped into judicial races, and the resulting rising tide of
judicial politicalization.
In July of this year, the ABA's Commission on Public Financing
of Judicial Campaigns released its report and the picture was
neither pretty nor hopeful.59 The growth in spending on contested
judgeship races is breathtaking.
" In Michigan, a winning supreme court candidate raised
$180,000 in 1994;60 four years later, the winning candidate
raised over $1 million.61
* In North Carolina, the highest amount spent in a 1988 su-
preme court race was $90,300; six years later it had climbed to
almost $242,000.62 Last year, the state had its first $1,000,000
Supreme Court campaign.63
59. ABA REPORT, supra note 36.
60. Id. at 10. The dollar amounts have been rounded. For exact figures see the
report.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Glaberson, supra note 55, at Al.
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" In Alabama, spending on two supreme court seats increased
from $237,000 in 1986 to $2.1 million in 1996.64
" In the last Michigan Supreme Court race, $16 million was
spent.65 Ohio,66 Pennsylvania, 67 Mississippi6 8-the list just
goes on. That buys a lot of justice-or at least that's what the
public believes, according to the surveys that we have seen.69
And the facts indicate that funds are coming from increasingly
narrow interests.
* In Illinois, one candidate accepted $80,000 from ten personal
injury law firms.7°
" A Baton Rouge newspaper reported that "Groups with major
financial interests in judicial decisions-trial lawyers and busi-
ness-are investing heavily in 'their candidates for races."' 71
" In Michigan, the Michigan Manufacturers Weekly Newsletter
boasted that, "During 1998-99, MMA-PAC contributions
swayed the Supreme Court election to a conservative view-
point, ensuring a pro-manufacturing agenda. 72
" In the wake of the 2000 supreme court races in Ohio and
Michigan, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce took credit for
spending millions of dollars during the campaigns.73
" During the 2001 Pennsylvania Supreme Court election, nar-
row interest groups were responsible for significant spending
64. ABA REPORT, supra note 36, at 9-10.
65. Glaberson, supra note 55, at Al.
66. Id.
67. James Eisenstein, Some Order For The Court, Pirr. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 15,
2000, at E4.
68. ABA REPORT, supra note 36, at 13.
69. Id. at 22-23 (stating that nine out of ten Ohio and Pennsylvania residents be-
lieved that campaign contributions influenced judicial decisions). Moreover, the re-
port states that "48% of [Texas] judges indicated that money had an impact on
judicial decisions." Id. at 23 (citing SUPREME COURT OF TEX., STATE BAR OF TEX.
AND TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., THE COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
TEXAS-INSIDER'S PERSPECTIVE (1999)).
70. Id. at 13.
71. Id. (citing Lanny Keller, Judicial Campaigns Undermine Respect, THE ADVO-
CATE, Jan. 13, 2000).
72. Id. at 18 (citing George Weeks, Fix is Long Overdue on Selection for State
Supreme Court, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 28, 1999).
73. Naftali Bendavid, Report: Public Should Finance Judge Elections; ABA Panel
Says Campaigns Getting Nastier and Costly, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 2001 at 7 (reporting
that, "The [Chamber of Commerce] spent more than $7 million last year on judicial
races, focusing its activities on four states-Michigan, Ohio, Mississippi and
Alabama").
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on television and print ads that generated litigation over the
legality of the tactics. 4
And we already know, from the claims of those with the dollars,
that the 2002 judicial elections will be more costly and contentious
than ever before. Millions of dollars are being readied for cam-
paign contributions and issue ads.75
Million dollar judicial campaigns give the impression that justice
is for sale, or if not for sale, that it can be rented from one election
to the next. This is an affront to the American justice system. Pub-
lic respect for the legislative and executive branches has been bat-
tered in recent years. We cannot allow our judicial elections to
denigrate to the level of gubernatorial, mayoral, or legislative
races. Our courtrooms must remain the inviolable sanctuaries of
our rights.
The ABA has long felt that the best answer is merit selection of
judges and, indeed, the "preferred" selection method.76 But one
has to realize that, given the state of public opinion, merit selection
is not a viable option in many states and is at best a long-term goal.
It is time to reconceptualize our approach to improvement of state
judicial selection so that we can move beyond merit selection to
reap its benefits without its baggage. So, how can we improve the
system we have in the short-term, and provide a solid foundation
for maintaining American judicial independence in the twenty-first
century?
The ABA's menu of improvements is one place to start. We
know that judicial reform must be well tailored to the cultures and
customs of local jurisdictions. One size does not fit all. Yet there is
much to be commended in the recent ABA report on public financ-
ing of judicial campaigns and its efforts to respond to inappropriate
judicial criticism and to improve state judicial selection methods.
The report calls upon states that select judges through contested
74. Bodack v. Law Enforcement Alliance of Am., No. 120 WM 2001, 2001 Pa.
LEXIS 2386, at *9-10 (Sup. Ct Nov. 5, 2001) (Castille, J., dissenting) (discussing the
prior restraints issues raised by limitations of campaign advertisement that occurred
in the 2001 election).
75. See Adam Clymer, A Bid to Change, an Uncertain Future, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 2002, at A31; Congress: The Issue-by-Issue Outlook for 2002, Nat'l J., Jan. 19, 2002.
76. ABA REPORT, supra note 36, at 5 n.3 (stating that "The ABA has long sup-
ported merit selection systems"). The ABA reaffirmed this recently when it adopted
the recommendation for public financing. Press Release, supra note 53. See Charles
Gardner Geyh, National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection: Publicly Financed
Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1476 (2001) for a discus-
sion of an alternative system to publicly finance judicial elections.
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elections to institute public financing of judicial campaigns.77 This
would eliminate the perceived impropriety associated with receiv-
ing contributions from those who may have an interest in the out-
come of cases before the court.
The report recommends a number of qualifying safeguards and
elements to make public financing effective. It strongly recom-
mends funding from "a stable and sufficient revenue source ' 78 to
ensure a successful system. I am proud to be a leader in the organi-
zation that undertook this seminal study and report.
I am also proud that my home state, North Carolina, is taking a
lead on improving judicial selection. It has made a noble effort to
adopt merit selection but has come to recognize that this objective
is just not politically possible to achieve. With its characteristic
can-do spirit, the state has adopted nonpartisan elections for trial
judges in both the superior and district courts.79 Now it is poised to
become only the second state in the country to enact a system of
public financing of judicial campaigns, with a substantial voter
awareness program. It may in fact, become the first state to create
a financially viable comprehensive public financing system for judi-
cial campaigns. The North Carolina Senate has been courageous in
adopting this program and we can hope that the House will also
follow its example when the bill comes up next year.
These actions are a great step forward to preserve the integrity
of North Carolina courts. The state has a unique opportunity to
lead the nation, something North Carolinians usually do in a quiet,
respectful way. North Carolina is working hard to preserve judi-
cial independence. This is a good example for the rest of the coun-
try to follow.
77. Press Release, supra note 53.
78. Id. at 63.
79. Glaberson, supra note 55, at Al.
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